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Purpose: (1) Determine whether there is an inconsistency between the disclosed WACC and the 
WACC applied in CGU’s for internal impairment tests, with respect to IAS 36. (2) Determine to 
what extent companies apply a company-wide WACC internally in all CGU’s, when conducting 
impairment tests in accordance with IAS 36. (3) Describe and analyse the incentives for 
companies to apply a company-wide WACC in all CGU’s, and what effect this could have on 
impairment tests. 	  
Methodology: In this paper we used both an inductive and a deductive perspective. The survey 
we distributed, and the review of annual reports, examined the application of discount rates in 
practice, through a descriptive manner. We also applied case studies through a normative 
perspective, in order to analyse and prescribe how companies should operate in accordance with 
best practice. 	  
Theoretical perspectives: The literature review concerned calculations of WACC for CGU’s 
and how disclosure policy could affect the cost of capital. This was extended by a review of the 
positive accounting theory, in order to analyse whether companies had incentives to act 
opportunistic by applying a company-wide WACC. We also added the institutional theory, 
which allowed us to analyse if WACC disclosures were affected by decoupling or institutional 
factors. 	  
Empirical foundation: We gathered data from the annual reports of 118 Swedish listed 
companies, regarding their application of discount rates within CGU’s. We also distributed a 
survey that targeted CFO’s from 40 of these 118 companies. This survey provided internal 
information and arguments regarding companies’ application of WACC. Four case studies, 
modelled by data gathered from a database held by Stern School of Business in New York, 
exemplified and analysed best practice in IAS 36.	  
Conclusions: We concluded that a majority of the companies in this paper disclosed a company-
wide WACC, and that this was consistent with the WACC the companies applied internally. 
Companies that applied a company-wide WACC often considered their CGU’s to have the same 
risk. However, the arguments of some of these risk assessments could be questioned. It does not 
appear that companies apply a company-wide WACC to affect the impairment test, and we see 
no general reluctance towards the use of a CGU-specific WACC. However, companies appear to 
have difficulties of establishing CGU-specific WACC, which seems to have a negative effect on 
the degree of application. 	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1	  Introduction	  
1.1	  Background	  
The valuation of external investments, such as mergers and acquisitions, is a subject that is a key 
part of corporate finance and accounting. These investments could be considered as different 
projects that a company should evaluate by using the specific risk characteristics of the 
particular project, if the risk differs from the rest of the company’s assets (Oesch and Schmid, 
2013). Kruger et al. (2011, p. 1-6) analysed the use of a company-wide discount rate (in this 
paper also referred to as WACC or cost of capital) in North American diversified conglomerates, 
and reached the conclusion that this was quite commonly applied for investments that did not 
have the same risk as the rest of a company’s assets. This so called “WACC fallacy” was also 
proven by Graham and Harvey (2001, p. 3), who used a survey method to investigate the use of 
company-wide WACC within Fortune 500 companies. 60% of 392 surveyed CFO’s admitted 
that they would almost always apply a company-wide discount rate, even if the investment 
would have different risk characteristics (Graham and Harvey, 2001, p. 10).  	  
Companies that apply a company-wide discount rate, for investments that differ in risk from the 
rest of the company’s assets, are exposed to certain problems and implications. For instance, this 
WACC fallacy could lead to an overestimation of investments that are riskier than the 
company’s typical investments (Kruger et al., 2011, p. 2). Companies could therefore tend to 
overinvest in divisions that have a beta value higher than the company-wide beta, and vice versa 
(Kruger et al., 2011, p. 25). This could be evident in conglomerates, as it is almost useless to 
apply a company-wide discount rate for investments in different unrelated industries and 
segments (Brealey et al., 2011, p. 243-249). Companies that apply a company-wide discount rate 
could perform very random estimations of the company’s value and performance (Bancel et al., 
2013, p. 18). 	  
Financial expert CEO’s and CFO’s seems to be less likely to fall into the WACC fallacy 
(Custodio and Metzger, 2012, p. 38). The use of a company-wide discount rate could therefore 
relate to a lack of sophistication, or that companies might consider it to be a sort of arbitrage 
opportunity to value risky investments with a low cost of capital (Kruger et al., 2011, p. 4). 
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Managers could therefore have incentives to act opportunistic, by alternating their choice of 
discount rates to gain advantages (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990, p. 136). 	  
1.2	  Problem	  Discussion	  
Goodwill acquired in a business combination should be allocated to each of the acquirer’s cash 
generating units (henceforth referred to as CGU) that are expected to benefit from the synergies 
of the combination (EY, 2011, p. 6). IAS 36 requires companies, which have immaterial assets 
with indefinite useful lives, to each year test these assets for impairment. If the carrying amount 
of the asset, or the CGU it has been allocated to, exceeds the recoverable amount, there is a need 
for impairment. The recoverable amount is determined by the highest value of fair value less 
cost of disposal, and the value in use for the asset. Regardless of which method that was used to 
determine the recoverable amount, companies should disclose the discount rate used in the 
calculations (IAS 36:134). 	  
CGU’s are often exposed to different risks, due to being in different industries, markets, 
products, having different currencies, interest rates etc. (BDO, 2013, p. 44). For many 
companies it could therefore be inappropriate to apply a company-wide discount rate across 
multiple CGU’s, as this discount rate will not incorporate CGU-specific risk (BDO, 2013, p. 44). 
When the surveillance unit of NASDAQ OMX reviewed the application of IAS 36:134 in 
Swedish listed companies, they further emphasised that disclosures should be supplied per CGU 
(NASDAQ OMX Stockholm, 2013, p. 11). However, this was seldom the case, as many 
companies used the same assumptions for all CGU’s within their disclosures. 	  
We found it interesting to apply the theoretical perspectives of a company-wide WACC on new 
investments, on how companies use discount rates for impairment tests in CGU’s. However, the 
analysis of an application of a company-wide discount rate somewhat relies on the prerequisite 
that the internal company-wide WACC is not decoupled from the discount rates disclosed in the 
annual report. This link between internal practices and disclosed information has previously only 
been limitedly empirically tested (Ax and Marton, 2008, p. 434). We argued that impairment 
tests in CGU’s could be seen as a continuum from evaluating new investments, since part of a 
new investment, e.g. an acquisition, would probably be allocated as goodwill in one or more 
CGU’s. Therefore, our research added on to prior research, which demonstrated that the use of a 
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company-wide discount rate for new investments was common, by analysing if Swedish listed 
companies apply a company-wide discount rate in different CGU’s. We also developed a second 
perspective, as we analysed the consistency between internal and disclosed discount rates.  	  
In summary, we examined whether the WACC, that Swedish listed companies applied internally 
for impairment tests, were aligned with the WACC disclosed in their annual reports. We then 
analysed how common it was for the companies to apply a company-wide WACC for different 
CGU’s internally. Finally, we analysed why companies might apply a company-wide WACC in 
different CGU’s, and what the effects this application could have on the impairment tests. Our 
different perspectives resulted in three purposes. 	  
1.3	  Purpose	  
1: Determine whether there is an inconsistency between the disclosed WACC and the WACC 
applied in CGU’s for internal impairment tests, with respect to IAS 36. 	  
2: Determine to what extent companies apply a company-wide WACC internally in all CGU’s, 
when conducting impairment tests in accordance with IAS 36.	  
3: Describe and analyse the incentives for companies to apply a company-wide WACC in all 
CGU’s, and what effect this could have on impairment tests. 	  
2	  Method	  
2.1	  Introduction	  
We were initially determined to gather quantitative data to identify facts and trends about CGU’s 
and what type of discount rate companies disclosed in accordance with IAS 36. We decided that 
the best way to collect this information was to gather data from a large number of annual reports. 
Furthermore, we created and distributed a web-based survey. The purpose of the survey was to 
provide us with more in-depth information on how companies applied discount rates in different 
CGU’s. We also conducted minor case studies on four specific companies. The case studies 
were meant to identify and exemplify fundamental issues on the use of a company-wide discount 
rate in multiple CGU’s. The following sections provide more thorough explanations of the 
methods we used to gather and analyse data. 	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2.2	  Population	  
We chose to study Swedish listed companies on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm’s Large Cap, Mid 
Cap and Small Cap segments, i.e. all of the companies reported in accordance with IFRS. 
Another requirement to determine the population was that the chosen companies were in 
possession of immaterial assets with indefinite useful lives. Companies that were included in the 
population were also obliged to have allocated immaterial assets with indefinite useful lives, 
most often goodwill, to more than one CGU. Otherwise we would not be able to determine if the 
company would apply CGU-specific discount rates if additional CGU’s were established. This 
led to a total population of 118 companies. 	  
2.3	  Annual	  Reports	  
When the population of 118 companies was established, we gathered data from the entire 
population. A compilation of this data can be viewed in Appendix A. The quantitative data we 
gathered from annual reports provided a foundation for the thesis and further analysis. We used 
a structured observation approach, as we had formulated purposes and identified the objectives 
of the thesis prior to collecting information (Bell, 2011, p. 188). Thus, we were analysing 
selected parts of the annual reports. Although we used a structured approach, we reduced 
sampling errors by collecting data from the entire population, which is also known as taking a 
census (Cooper and Schindler, 2013, p. 84). This eliminated the problem of only addressing a 
sample of the population, which could reduce certainty of the representativeness (Greener, 2008, 
p. 47). Since we gathered complete data from annual reports, without conducting any further 
calculations, there was no room for the data to be influenced by the perception of the person that 
collected the information (Bell, 2011, p. 184). 	  
An alternative from gather data from annual reports was to include more questions in the survey. 
For example, we could have asked if a company disclosed a company-wide or CGU-specific 
discount rate. However, as these disclosures were simple for us to observe, we determined that 
gathering this data from annual reports, would secure that the disclosed information was correct. 
This also reduced the risk for companies to misinterpret the survey questions, answer 
incorrectly, or to mystify their answer. This approach also decreased the amount of survey 
questions, and therefore lessened the burden of the respondents. 	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We reviewed the latest published annual reports at the time of our data gathering. Since the data 
was gathered during a publishing period of annual reports, it included annual reports from 2012 
or 2013. We determined that there were no changes in regulation between 2012 and 2013 that 
could have influenced the data. Although, if specific companies had changed their discount rates 
from the annual report of 2012 to 2013, we did not consider this to have an impact on the thesis, 
as we to a larger extent sought to determine trends rather than specific discount rates. Even 
though the survey did not ask for specific disclosures, it worked as a complementary method to 
secure that the data gathered from annual reports was up to date. The annual report data included 
in our case studies was all gathered from annual reports of 2013.	  
The data from annual reports was analysed in both quantitative and qualitative manners. 
Foremost, we could determine in quantitative terms to what extent companies disclosed a 
company-wide discount rate or specific discount rates for different CGU’s. We also analysed 
tendencies, such as if the amount of CGU’s could have an impact on a company’s choice of a 
company-wide or CGU-specific discount rates. 	  
The data was also used in a qualitative manner, and as a reference point, when we created the 
survey and analysed its results. By cross-referencing survey answers with information gathered 
from annual reports, we could trace and validate survey answers. For example, we compared 
survey answers regarding similarity in risk between a company’s CGU’s, to how their CGU’s 
were divided within their annual report, e.g. by product/market/geographical area. This 
information was then to discuss whether it was reasonable for these companies to regard their 
CGU’s as having the same risk.  
2.4	  Survey	  
The population of 118 companies was also used when we created the survey. Thus, if a company 
on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm did not fulfil the requirements for the population, they were also 
excluded as possible survey respondents. These requirements were retained as we only wanted 
to address companies that had encountered the scenario of establishing discount rates for two or 
more CGU’s when they conducted their impairment tests. 	  
The survey was designed to gather information that we were not able to find from data in annual 
reports, or from a literature review. The survey, as well as the compilation of data from annual 
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reports, should be considered as primary sources. These primary sources were the least 
accessible, but were created by us to directly address our research problems (Greener, 2008, p. 
21). When we formulated survey questions, we used our literature review for advice. For 
example, we took some guidance from the article “The theory and practice of corporate finance: 
Evidence from the field” by Graham and Harvey (2001), which surveyed Fortune 500 
companies regarding the use of cost of capital. 	  
A corporate finance director at PwC in Malmö, as well as our thesis supervisors, piloted and 
reviewed our survey and gave us insightful comments before it was sent to possible respondents. 
The piloting was mainly conducted to ensure that the formulation of the questions was 
interpreted in the same manner as we intended (Bell, 2011, p. 14). This would increase the 
reliability of the study and the notion that the study would produce similar answers on multiple 
occasions, and also limit value-based interpretations (Bell, 2011, p. 117). The piloting 
strengthened the validity of our research, i.e. survey questions were formulated in a way that 
made it possible to draw conclusions aligned with our purposes (Bell, 2011, p. 118). 	  
When we had reached a somewhat manageable population, we conducted a census survey by 
addressing the entire population (Bell, 2011, p. 13). The survey was created as a web-based self-
completion questionnaire through SurveyMonkey. The reason for this was that we had a limited 
time scope to collect answers, and that a web-based survey made it easier to gather and analyse 
respondent data. The survey was aimed at CFO’s. However, if a company considered another 
employee as more eligible, we would also accept their responses. The non-CFO respondents 
included Group Controllers and Accounting Specialists/Accounting Experts. We requested email 
contact information from the population of 118 companies. Out of these 118 companies, we 
obtained contact information to 80 possible respondents. We could therefore no longer regard 
the survey as a census, but rather as a sample of the population.	  
The survey was sent out on April 15th. Two reminder emails were sent out, the first after five 
working days and the second after eight working days from the initial dispatch. Out of the 80 
surveys we sent out we received 40 answers, which gave a respondent ratio of 50%. We 
regarded this as a satisfactory result, as the survey required somewhat sensitive internal 
information and since it was aimed at top management (Cooper and Schindler, 2013).	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Seven possible respondents out of the sample of 80 had requested to not receive surveys through 
SurveyMonkey. Therefore we distributed the survey in a separate web-link to these potential 
respondents. However, if a respondent answered through the web-link we would not be able to 
trace the respondent, and compare their answer with information from their annual report. Since 
only one respondent answered through the web-link, we did not consider this to cause any 
sampling errors. Another respondent did not want to answer through the survey, but insisted on a 
brief telephone interview. We asked this respondent the exact same survey questions, and the 
answers were included into the compilation of survey answers. 	  
We regarded the sample as having resemblance to the entire population. We also argued that the 
respondents indicated an unbiased sample and that there was no major risk of systematic 
variance, i.e. influences in the sample that could have affected the results (Cooper and Schindler, 
2013, p. 341). Since we addressed the entire population, we considered the sample as a 
probability sample with a random selection (Cooper and Schindler, 2013, p. 343). Thus, we 
considered the 40 survey respondents to make out quite a reliable sample out of the population 
of 118 companies.	  
We created both an English and a Swedish version of the survey, since the sample also included 
non-Swedish respondents. Both versions are otherwise identical, and the English version can be 
seen in its entirety in Appendix B. To increase the validity of the answers, the first question in 
the survey asked the respondent to specify their position in the organisation. After this initial 
question, the survey was divided into three parts: (1) Internal Use of Discount Rates/WACC and 
CGU’s, (2) Discount Rates/WACC and CGU’s Within the Disclosures in the Annual Report, 
and (3) Creating a New CGU - a Hypothetical Example. We chose this structure to guide the 
respondents and to describe the area addressed in the forthcoming section of the survey. The 
three parts contained six questions in total, out of which four were mandatory. The mandatory 
questions contained pre-determined answers that the respondents had to choose from. In two of 
the mandatory questions the pre-determined answers were Yes or No, and the other two had pre-
determined answers which consisted of a variation of statements. These pre-determined 
statements were created and adjusted by us, with help from the literature review and the piloting 
of the survey. 	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The two non-mandatory questions were follow-up questions, which were included to obtain a 
deeper understanding of companies internal conduct. In one of these questions the respondent 
had to write their own answer. The other question provided both the possibility to choose 
multiple pre-determined statements, and for the respondent to write their own answer. The 
overall order of questions was divided with respect to complexity and potential inherent 
sensitivity (Cooper and Schindler, 2013, p. 318). Complex or somewhat sensitive questions were 
placed at the end of the survey, as we believed this would lessen respondent fallout. We 
considered that respondents might be reluctant to continue answering subsequent questions if 
these sensitive questions were in the beginning of the survey.	  
We used different theoretical perspectives when we analysed the survey in a qualitative manner. 
The qualitative approach was used to obtain a deeper understanding of how companies reasoned 
about their discount rates in CGU’s (Cooper and Schindler, 2013, p. 144). The survey consisted 
of several different categorical questions, and we argued that a qualitative analysis of its 
statistical material would be beneficial. It would not have been useful for us to apply regression 
analysis on the material, since we did not have one dependent variable that we were interested in 
understanding and modelling (Gujarati and Porter, 2010, p. 21). A regression analysis would be 
more beneficial if we chose to analyse how, for example, the use of a company-wide WACC 
was dependent on variables such as age or size of the company, amount of CGU’s, or 
differences for CGU’s in markets/products/countries. 	  
2.5	  Case	  Studies	  
We complemented our analysis with the use of case studies. These case studies were analysed in 
a qualitative manner, since we analysed the norm of how to apply CGU-specific WACC, as 
established by reviewed literature, and the possible effects of a different conduct. The analysis 
was not quantitative as we, for example, did not review how many companies that should have 
used, or would be affected by changing their company-wide WACC to, various CGU-specific 
WACC. Due to time limitation, we concluded upon four case studies as this amount was 
regarded as a minimum, by authors of business research methods (Cooper and Schindler, 2013, 
p. 166). 	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The information used for the case studies consisted solely of quantitative data from annual 
reports and a financial database. The financial database was held by Stern School of Business in 
New York (Damodaran 2014), and should therefore be considered as secondary data. Since the 
information from the financial database was not created for our specific purposes, we held a 
higher degree of caution when we applied it, especially regarding its initial intended purpose 
(Cooper and Schindler, 2013, p. 100). Furthermore, the material from Stern School of Business 
was updated in January 2014, and compiles information from Morningstar, Bloomberg and S&P 
Capital IQ (Damodaran, 2014). These are all trustworthy sources and should therefore be 
considered as reliable.  	  
The four case companies were chosen out of the 63 companies that disclosed a company-wide 
WACC for all CGU’s, in our population of 118 annual reports. Another criteria was that none of 
the four companies had participated in the survey, as this could have harmed the anonymity of 
the survey respondents. This limited our selection, as 45 companies now remained. When we 
evaluated the excluded companies and the ones that were left, we did not consider this limitation 
to have an impact on the selection of companies for the case studies. 	  
The database from Stern School of Business only had company and industry specific 
information for certain countries/industries (Damodaran, 2014). Therefore, we focused on 
finding case companies that had allocated CGU’s to those specific countries/industries from the 
database. Thus, the selection could not be seen as random. However, the four case companies 
were our first and final sample. Thus, we did not test our calculations on a number of cases and 
thereafter decided upon which companies to include in the paper. The four case companies have 
remained anonymous, as we did not consider revealing their names would add any value to the 
analysis. 	  
Instead of using the company-wide WACC that was disclosed in the annual reports from the four 
case companies, we used the company WACC that was provided in the material from Stern 
School of Business (Damodaran, 2014). Damodaran (2014) highlighted some potential 
limitations that should be considered when using the data from Stern School of Business. For 
instance, the data was collected in order to obtain industry average numbers, and more detailed 
information about specific companies is better obtained from annual reports. However, since we 
wanted to analyse and compare company-wide WACC with industry average WACC, we 
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decided that this comparison should be undertaken by only using the material from the database, 
and not the annual reports of the case companies. We considered this as especially important, 
due to the subjectivity inherited in the establishment of WACC components.	  
2.6	  Literature	  Review	  
All sources gathered in the literature review were secondary sources. We initially used these 
sources to study previously known research in order for us to establish a focus, and to 
understand what primary sources we should gather or create (Bell, 2011, p. 123). Some of the 
reviewed articles provided theory of how to make calculations using the correct WACC. We 
made a clear distinction of articles that concerned WACC for evaluating new investments, and 
articles that concerned WACC for impairment tests. Articles that concerned WACC for 
impairment tests were used to gain knowledge of best practice and where the different 
components in WACC are derived from. These articles also helped us understand and analyse 
how companies might seek to use and adjust WACC in ways that would benefit the company. 
Connected to this issue, the positive accounting theory was reviewed to further gain a theoretical 
understanding of how a company-wide WACC could be part of an opportunistic act. In other 
words, if a company-wide WACC might be used as a tool for a company to put CGU’s, and the 
company, in a better position than what might be the truth, with regards to risk. This theoretical 
view was especially useful when we analysed the case studies.	  
We also gathered and analysed articles that concerned disclosure policy. This literature provided 
knowledge about how disclosures in annual reports may be affected by how competitors disclose 
information. Closely related to this was literature regarding if, or why, companies might disclose 
different information than what reflects reality. This discussion could be further connected to the 
data we gathered from the survey. The institutional theory, which focuses on disclosures, was 
reviewed to establish a deeper theoretical understanding and analysis of our empirical findings. 
The institutional theory made it possible to discuss both how isomorphisms and competitors 
might influence company disclosures, but also the possibility and reason for companies to 
decouple internal discount rates from those disclosed in the annual report.	  
The choice of the positive accounting theory and the institutional theory also worked as an 
explanatory device for the key factors and relationships we analysed (Bell, 2011, p. 103). The 
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positive accounting theory and the institutional theory helped us to distinguish and discuss if the 
application of a company-wide discount rate was based on internal, and perhaps opportunistic 
factors, or more on an external institutional behaviour, e.g. to mimic other companies through 
disclosures. Another possibility was that the choice of a company-wide discount rate derived 
from a combination of the two theoretical perspectives.  	  
A substantial amount of the articles included in the literature review were academic articles 
published in peer-reviewed journals. These articles were gathered using trusted academic search 
engines, such as Lund University’s LUBsearch. We also used information from textbooks 
published by well renowned academic publishers. This ensured reliability and empirically 
established conclusions in both the articles and the textbooks we used. Other publications 
included material from large auditing or consulting firms. The content of these publications were 
not always empirically established, and it was important to recognise that it could contain bias 
towards the use of specific elements and procedures. Therefore, to ensure reliability, we 
obtained a critical perspective regarding possible underlying purposes or audiences for these 
publications.  	  
2.7	  Method	  Summary	  
Figure 1, on the next page, summarise the main methods used when we collected and analysed 
data. The figure describes which of the purposes these methods were mainly aimed at and with 
what intent the methods were used. 	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Figure 1	  
Methodological scheme 
When we applied the methodological scheme, we initially gathered data on disclosures of 
WACC with regards to IAS 36:134. Then we used the annual report data and reviewed literature 
to define facts and procedures, and created a survey to gather additional empirical data (Cooper 
and Schindler, 2013, p. 66). Lastly, we used results from the two data gathering methods to 
create case studies. In addition to the three chosen methods, we also conducted a literature 
review. The literature review supported both the gathering and analytical stages of all three 
methods, but mainly the analysis of the case studies.	  
By using a deductive method, we took advantage of theory and experience to argue why a 
certain conduct, the use of a company-wide discount rate for all CGU’s, should or should not be 
desired (Cooper and Schindler, 2013, p. 66). Therefore, some parts of our analysis were based 
on a normative theoretical perspective, as we, mainly through case studies, sought to prescribe 
how companies should operate (Deegan and Unerman, 2011, p. 9). However, our analysis of 
annual reports, as well as the survey we distributed, was mostly based on an inductive approach, 
as both these sought to examine the application of discount rates (Cooper and Schindler, 2013, p. 
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69). Thus, the survey and the analysis of annual reports were more closely connected to a 
descriptive theoretical perspective than a normative one (Deegan and Unerman, 2011, p. 254). 	  
3	  Literature	  Review	  
3.1	  Application	  and	  Disclosure	  of	  WACC	  
One prerequisite for our analysis of the application of a company-wide discount rate, and its 
implications, was to certify that the WACC disclosed in the annual report was in fact also used 
internally. If this was not the case, an analysis that were partly based on discount rates provided 
in annual reports, would be based on inaccurate information (Ax and Marton, 2008, p. 434). 
Users of the annual report would then also have received information that was not aligned with 
internal procedures, which could impact the decisions of users, competitors and managerial 
actions (Lambert et al., 2007, p. 408). This could be viewed as an opportunistic act, in which 
managers decouples the internal accounting procedures from the information provided in annual 
reports (Deegan and Unerman, 2011, p. 274-275). In this scenario, decoupling, as a part of the 
institutional theory, is a method in which actual managerial and operational practices are 
different from those presented in, for example, financial statements and disclosures. Decoupling 
is a method managers may use in order to make it seem as the organisation is adopting particular 
institutional practices (Deegan and Unerman, 2011, p. 364)	  
The quality of a company’s disclosures could also have an impact on the cost of capital of the 
company, due to having an effect on the expected cash flows and covariance of expected cash 
flows of the company. Effects on the expected cash flows are related to market participant’s 
perception of the distribution of these cash flows (Lambert et al., 2007, p. 410). The covariance 
effect relates to an effect on the real decisions of the company, which could alter the future 
distribution of cash flows. An effect on the cost of capital would, in turn, have an impact on the 
investments that companies view as optimal (Lambert et al., 2007, p. 408).  	  
Better accounting information should improve the capital investment decisions between firms 
and investors (Lambert et al., 2007, p. 409). Investors would therefore require a lower expected 
return, due to not having to incorporate poor accounting information quality in the share price. 
The benefits of a lower cost of capital could be viewed in the light of the efficiency perspective 
within positive accounting theory, since it assumes that managers use accounting practices that 
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best reflect the performance of the company (Deegan and Unerman, 2011, p. 273). However, the 
perspectives of the positive accounting theory also inherit some critique. Positive accounting 
theory relies on assumptions such as individuals acting in self-interest, if it would increase their 
wealth. These assumptions may be seen as far too simplistic when describing how individuals 
make decisions. Another implication is that much empirical material seems to reject the 
hypotheses used in the positive accounting theory (Deegan and Unerman, 2011, p. 256). 	  
3.2	  Influences	  On	  and	  Benefits	  From	  Disclosures	  
The institutional theory also analyses, through a theoretical perspective, information and 
disclosures as a mean to gain advantages, with regards to the relationships between organisations 
and stakeholders (Deegan and Unerman, 2011, p. 321). Primarily, it is proposed that behaviour 
is used as a tool for organisations to increase legitimacy (Deegan and Unerman, 2011, p. 358). In 
this paper, two isomorphisms of the institutional theory help to explain why organisations might 
be prone to adopt similar characteristics and form (Deegan and Unerman, 2011, p. 357). The 
normative isomorphism is a result of professional pressure, e.g. from group norms favouring 
certain practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 152). The mimetic isomorphism examines how 
some organisations might seek to imitate practices of other organisations, often in order to 
decrease uncertainty and increase legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 151). 	  
Much of the literature on providing disclosures discusses voluntary disclosures, but providing 
discount rates in accordance with IAS 36 is mandatory. However, the requirements of IAS 36 
provide some room for how information is disclosed and expressed in the annual report. The 
theoretical perspectives of voluntary disclosures could therefore be used when we analyse a 
company´s choice of disclosing and/or applying a company-wide WACC for all CGU’s, or 
specific per CGU WACC.	  
A survey made by Graham et al. (2005, p. 27-35) demonstrated that many CFO’s in the U.S. 
considered reducing uncertainty about company prospects the most important issue for making 
voluntary disclosures. The authors also argue that companies do not want to set a level of 
disclosures that could be difficult to maintain in the future and that companies have a concern of 
revealing proprietary information. In this sense, managers could have an incentive to limit public 
information in order to avoid an effective monitoring from the financial markets (Deegan and 
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Unerman, 2011, p. 286). This could also be analysed in the light of institutional practices and 
isomorphisms. 	  
In a similar manner, Ax and Marton (2008) analysed the consistency between human capital 
disclosures and internal human capital management practices. Although their research did not 
concern disclosure practices regarding WACC, we argue that parts of their discussion was 
applicable for our analysis. The authors provided some points on how annual report disclosures 
could be affected by disclosure strategies and internal measurement difficulties (Ax and Marton, 
2008, p. 447). First, there might be a risk of providing strategic information to competitors. 
Second, there is a cost of collecting information and creating disclosures. Third, the lack of 
knowledge about how to measure certain information, caused by an absence of a common 
framework on measurement and reporting, might influence the disclosures (Ax and Marton, 
2008, p. 449).	  
The potential loss of proprietary information from disclosures, and the benefits of reducing 
information asymmetry with capital markets, might be seen as a trade-off for managers. The 
Conceptual Framework of IFRS (§44) highlights the relationship between cost and benefit with 
regards to information in annual reports. The cost of providing the information should not 
exceed the benefits derived from it. Although the Conceptual Framework of IFRS does not 
discuss the relationship of cost and benefit with regards to the choice of a specific accounting 
practice, the reasoning of cost and benefit could be used to analyse how companies may decide 
upon using a company-wide discount rate or CGU-specific discount rates.	  
3.3	  WACC	  for	  Impairment	  Tests	  	  
In order to analyse WACC for different CGU’s, it was necessary to clarify what these CGU’s are 
and how they could be established. A CGU is the smallest identifiable group of assets that 
generate cash inflows that are mostly independent of from other cash inflows generated by other 
assets or groups of assets (Deloitte, 2012). BDO (2013, p. 11) adds that the segmentation of 
CGU’s could include an entire company, different businesses within a company, or production 
lines within a company or a department. CGU’s could also include groups of equipment, or plant 
and property within a company or department. 	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The discount rate used for impairment tests on immaterial assets in CGU’s may not always be 
the same discount rate as the one a company evaluate external investments with. IAS 36:A17, 
recommends that the company WACC is used as a starting point for obtaining a CGU-specific 
discount rate. Husmann and Schmid (2008, p. 60) further argues that the company WACC is in 
fact the only suitable starting point to determine a suitable discount rate for impairment in 
CGU’s. However, IAS 36:A18 clarifies that WACC must be further adjusted to reflect how the 
market might assess the specific risk of the asset, and exclude risk that is not relevant. 
Adjustments for specific risks such as country risk, price risk and currency risk associated with 
the CGU’s are also necessary to undertake (PwC, 2012). This method of obtaining a CGU-
specific WACC, which we focus on in this thesis, is labelled as the traditional approach. 	  
IAS 36 also specifies the expected cash flow approach. When applying this method, companies 
should adjust their cash flows instead of the discount rate. The cash flows should then be 
discounted with a WACC that does not include the risk reflected in the cash flows. This 
approach might be more effective in some cases, namely when it is too difficult to produce a 
risk-adjusted discount rate, or when there exists multiple cash flow scenarios (Wiecek et al., 
2013, p. 46). IAS 36:A15 emphasises that it is important to not adjust both the discount rate and 
the cash flows for specific risks, as this will result in double counting some assumptions. 	  
Companies should use surrogates/pure plays whenever an asset specific discount rate is not 
directly available from the market (EY, 2011, p. 8). Surrogates/pure plays are companies that are 
publicly traded in the market, in the same line of business segment as the specific CGU, and not 
involved in any other type of business (Oesch and Schmid, 2013). If a company choose to use a 
discount rate prior to or after tax does not really matter, the important thing is that the company 
applies a pre-tax rate to pre-tax cash flows and vice versa, since both procedures should lead to 
the same result (McPhee, 2012, p. 32). 	  
It does seem as calculation of WACC is a difficult issue. EY (2011, p. 10) recognises that the 
calculations are complex and that there seems to be a lack of any general consensus. Although, 
companies should put much effort into obtaining an appropriate discount rate, as it is a crucial 
part of the impairment test.	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3.4	  Components	  of	  WACC	  for	  CGU’s	  
In conjunction with the prior section of WACC for impairment tests, this section reviews 
literature that analysed the components inherited in the WACC formula. We relate this section 
both to positive accounting theory and cost/benefit from the Conceptual Framework of IFRS, 
since we provide the norm of best practice from the Appendix in IAS 36. The positive 
accounting theory complement this further, when we analyse if companies might act 
opportunistic, due to being exposed to a complex framework.  	  
The WACC formula is a blended measure of the company cost of capital, i.e. a weighted average 
of a cost and required return (Fernandez, 2011, p 5): 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 =    𝐸(𝐸 + 𝐷)   ×  𝑅! + 𝐷𝐸 + 𝐷   ×  𝑅!   ×  (1 − 𝑇!)	  
Equation 1, WACC	  
Debt and Equity Levels in CGU’s	  
The amount of weightings of debt (D) and equity (E) for a CGU should be based upon a market 
capital structure, i.e a capital structure that reflects what an investor would apply when investing 
in the CGU (BDO, 2013, p. 43). This is also recognised in IAS 36:A19, which emphasises that a 
company should use a typical market debt level. The discount rate a company applies to 
different CGU’s for impairment tests is therefore independent of a company’s capital structure 
and the way the company financed the purchase of the asset. The debt-equity ratio for the CGU 
is best obtained by identifying an average level of gearing for entities operating in the same 
industry as the CGU (EY, 2011, p. 10). 	  
Cost of Equity and the Risk Free Rate in CGU’s	  
The next part we look at is the cost of equity (Re). The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is 
often used for estimating the cost of equity, by adding risk premiums to the risk-free rate 
(McPhee 2012, p. 33): 
𝐸 𝑅! =   𝑅! + 𝛽!(𝐸 𝑅! − 𝑅!)	  
Equation 2, CAPM	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CGU beta (β)  could be estimated from listed comparable companies, but would need 
deleveraging due to reflecting the capital structure of those companies. A listed company has 
some benchmark in its own beta, but it should be compared to other market participants as well 
(McPhee, 2012, p 35). Financial managers often use an industry beta in order to reduce 
estimation errors. beta should be based upon the typical market levels of debt and equity for the 
CGU. In practice it is quite common that companies apply an entity level beta to all CGU’s 
within the company, but the company should apply separate CGU-level levered betas to each 
CGU (BDO, 2013, p. 45). 	  
The risk free rate (Rf) in Equation 2, could be established from issued long term bonds in the 
different jurisdiction of the CGU’s of the company, i.e. government bonds with 10-30 years to 
maturity, or by using high quality corporate bonds if the CGU operates in a high quality market 
for this type of bonds (McPhee, 2012, p. 34). Although, there seems to be little consensus 
regarding what time horizon for the risk free rate that financial managers use, which results in 
the fact that two companies operating in the same industry might estimate different costs of 
equity (Jacobs and Shivdasani, 2012, p. 6). Companies are required to use a risk free rate that 
applies to the jurisdiction in which the CGU operates (BDO, 2013, p. 41). The market risk 
premium is usually determined based upon a comparison of long-term stock yields and risk free 
bond yields over a certain period of time (KPMG, 2012, p. 27). 	  
Cost of Debt in CGU’s 	  
If a company does not have debt instruments traded in the market, the cost of debt (Rd) could be 
determined by using the risk free rate and adjust it to include market risk premium that would 
apply to a similar entity or CGU (BDO, 2013, p. 43). The cost of debt should reflect the 
financing cost of a potential purchaser and could be derived from ratings of peer group 
companies, or returns from industrial bonds of peer group companies (KPMG, 2012, p. 25). 	  
The Tax Rate in Different CGU’s 	  
It is quite common that companies disclose a post-tax discount rate, since WACC is estimated 
on a post-tax basis, even though IAS 36 requires the disclosure of a pre-tax discount rate (BDO, 
2013, p. 44-50). Companies should recognise that the pre-tax discount rate is often not equal to 
the post-tax discount rate grossed up by a standard tax-rate (KPMG, 2012, p. 27). A marginal tax 
rate should be used for each country the CGU’s are located in, and a weighted average of the tax 
	   19	  
rate where applicable (KPMG, 2012, p. 25). However, Jacobs and Shivdasani (2012, p. 6) 
recognises that it is quite common for companies to use an effective tax rate. The use of an 
effective tax rate could have a vast impact on the WACC, due to sometimes being significantly 
lower than the marginal tax rate.	  
4	  Empirical	  Results	  
4.1	  Population	  and	  Survey	  Respondent	  Ratios	  
Table 1 below provides an overview of the ratio between company-wide WACC and CGU-
specific WACC, from the information we gathered from annual reports of the population of 118 
companies. The information is divided by the various segments that the companies are listed on, 
i.e. Large Cap, Mid Cap, and Small Cap. The entirety of the gathered information from annual 
reports can be viewed in Appendix A.	  
	  
Table 1	  
Data gathered from annual reports from the population of 118 companies	  
Table 2 below depicts the distribution of survey respondents.	  
	  
Table 2	  
Survey respondents	  
The Company-wide WACC and Per CGU WACC rows in Table 1 and Table 2 describes if a 
specific company disclosed a company-wide WACC for all CGU’s, or CGU-specific WACC for 
CGU’s. Comparing the 40 survey respondents to the total population of 118 companies, we were 
satisfied by the distribution of respondents. The ratio of respondents on Large Cap, Mid Cap, 
and Small Cap was similar to what was represented in the total population. The total ratio of 
companies that disclosed a company-wide WACC or CGU-specific WACC was also somewhat 
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aligned with what was represented in the total population. Even though some deviances existed, 
we did not see this as an indication of a sampling error. The allocation of respondents in each 
segment in the survey is quite small and minor changes would therefore cause rather large 
changes in percentage ratios. Furthermore, the deviances concerned both a larger percentage 
ratio of Large Cap survey respondents, and a smaller percentage ratio of Small Cap respondents, 
that disclosed a company-wide WACC, than what was the case for the total population. Again, 
this indicated that there did not exist any large sampling errors.	  
The first question in the survey asked what position the respondent held in the company. Out of 
the 40 respondents 21 were CFO’s, 14 were Group Controllers, and 5 were Accounting 
Specialists/Accounting Experts.	  
4.2	  Comparison	  Between	  the	  Amount	  of	  CGU’s	  and	  Type	  of	  WACC	  
Figure 2 presents a general overview by comparing the amount of CGU’s our population of 118 
companies disclosed in their latest annual report, with whether the companies disclosed a 
company-wide WACC for CGU’s or CGU-specific WACC.  
	  
Figure 2	  
The amounts of CGU’s for companies that disclosed a company-wide discount rate and CGU-specific discount 
rates	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83% of the companies that disclosed a company-wide WACC had between two and five CGU’s, 
and 73% of the companies that disclosed CGU-specific WACC had between two and five 
CGU’s. As seen in figure 2, there was a somewhat larger amount of companies with two or three 
CGU’s that disclosed a company-wide discount rate, than companies that disclosed specific per 
CGU. However, there were 63 companies that disclosed a company-wide WACC in our 
population, and 55 companies that disclosed different CGU-specific WACC. It is therefore hard 
to determine if there is any correlation between the amounts of CGU’s reported by the 
companies and whether they disclosed a company-wide discount rate or a CGU-specific 
discount rate. If these trends were to be analysed further, it would be possible to run a regression 
analysis and discover whether there is a significant relationship between the amount of CGU’s 
and what type of WACC that companies apply in these CGU´s. However, this was not included 
in the main purposes of the thesis.	  
4.3	  Survey	  Results	  
In this section of the empirical results we compiled the data gathered from the survey. We have 
presented the data by how it best represents the gathered information and how we chose to 
analyse it. Therefore, this section does not necessarily follow the structure of the survey, as the 
structure of the survey was decided by other factors. Some data has been presented in tables 
which cross-references two or more questions, in order to establish a more thorough 
understanding of the survey answers. The complete survey answers of each respondent can be 
seen in Appendix C. 	  
Initially we presented the data that established whether there was a consistency between the 
internally applied WACC and the disclosed WACC. Second, we show the results of CGU risk 
assessment and specification of the type of WACC that was applied internally. Then, we display 
the arguments that companies gave for using a company-wide WACC. Finally, this section ends 
with a presentation of which type of WACC companies would choose internally and in the 
disclosures for a new hypothetical CGU. 	  
4.3.1	  Consistency	  Between	  Internal	  and	  Disclosed	  WACC,	  Questions	  5	  and	  6	  	  
Question 5 is related to whether companies decoupled their internally used discount rates from 
the disclosed ones. This issue was important to clarify, since we primarily wanted to discuss how 
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the use of a company-wide discount rate would affect internal operations. The survey results 
displayed that all 40 companies except one used the same WACC internally as the WACC they 
disclosed in the annual report. 	  
Question 6 was related to Question 5 as it targeted those respondents, who in Question 5 
answered that their disclosed discount rates were not consistent with the discount rates used 
internally, to specify the reason for this. The only respondent applicable to answer Question 6 
chose to express their arguments in their own words. This respondent answered, “We do not 
disclose our discount rates in the annual report”. We were somewhat confused by this answer, 
since the company did in fact disclose WACC for different CGU’s in their annual report from 
2012 and 2013. 	  
4.3.2	  CGU	  Risk	  Assessment	  and	  Internal	  WACC,	  Questions	  2	  and	  3	  	  
Question 2 asked if the respondents considered their different CGU’s to have a similar risk 
profile, with respect to markets, products and/or geographical areas. Out of 40 answers, 23 
answered “yes” and 17 answered “no”. 	  
Question 3 investigated what type of WACC the companies applied internally when they 
performed impairment tests in different CGU’s. The respondents could choose between three 
pre-determined alternatives. Out of the 40 respondents, 21 answered that they applied the same 
company-wide WACC for all of their CGU’s and 14 respondents answered that they applied a 
specific per CGU WACC for each of their CGU’s. 5 respondents answered that they used a 
company-wide WACC for some CGU’s, and specific WACC for others.	  
In order to attain a better understanding of the procedures within the companies, we created 
Table 3, which cross-references the answers of Question 2 and Question 3. Row Q2 in Table 3, 
i.e. Question 2, demonstrates whether a company considered all of their CGU’s to have the same 
risk. The three Q3 rows, i.e. the alternatives of Question 3, explains what type of WACC a 
specific company used internally, with regards to their response in Question 2. 
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Table 3	  
Cross-reference between Question 2 and Question 3	  
As we see, the most common choice, for respondents considering their CGU’s to have the same 
risk profile, was to use a company-wide WACC for all CGU’s internally. It is also evident that 
most of the respondents, who considered their CGU’s to have different risks, would use CGU-
specific WACC for different CGU’s. 	  
4.3.3	  Arguments	  for	  Internal	  Use	  of	  a	  Company-­‐wide	  WACC,	  Question	  4	  
Question 4 was aimed at respondents who in Question 3 answered that they used a company-
wide WACC internally for all of their CGU’s. We requested the respondent to specify their 
arguments for using a company-wide WACC, in a text box. We combined similarly expressed 
answers in order to make the 21 acquired remarks more manageable. The answers are presented 
in Table 4. 	  
	  
Table 4	  
Question 4, arguments from respondents for choosing a company-wide WACC in all CGU’s	  
The most common answer was that a company-wide WACC was used for all CGU’s, as the 
CGU’s were affected by the same prerequisites and levels of risk. Some of these nine answers 
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included companies that considered their different CGU operations as being the same and 
exposed to the same risks. 	  
As seen in Table 4, three respondents expressed somewhat differently that they had difficulties 
with producing specific WACC for different CGU’s. These answers included that it was hard to 
evaluate differences in risks, that they had no relevant method to produce specific WACC, and 
that a company-wide WACC was used for practical reasons. 	  
Three respondents answered that they only allocated goodwill to one single CGU. These 
respondents all changed their distribution of CGU’s from two or more CGU’s in 2012 to one 
single CGU in their annual report of 2013. Their annual reports from 2013 were not published at 
the time we gathered our data, which lead to an inconsistency from the annual report of 2012. 
However, as all of these respondents had goodwill allocated to two or more CGU’s in the annual 
report from 2012, we chose to include their answers in the data.	  
4.3.4	  Creating	  a	  New	  CGU	  –	  a	  Hypothetical	  Example,	  Question	  7	  
In Question 7 the respondents were told that they had to create a new CGU, which goodwill was 
allocated to, due to entering a new market/product/industry and/or geographical area with a 
different risk profile than existing CGU’s. The respondents then chose both what type of WACC 
they would apply for the new CGU in the internal impairment tests, and within the disclosures in 
the annual report. We provided four pre-written choices, as well as an additional option for 
respondents who wanted to specify their choice. The respondents were only able to choose one 
of the five options.        
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Figure 3	  
Question 7, what type of WACC the respondents would apply both internally and in the disclosures for a new CGU, 
which inherited a different risk profile than existing CGU’s	  
As seen in Figure 3, 33 of the 40 respondents, answered that they would choose a CGU-specific 
WACC, adapted to the different risk profile of the new CGU, both for the internal impairment 
tests as well as within the disclosures. Six respondents concluded that they would choose a 
company-wide WACC for all CGU’s, including the newly created CGU, for both the internal 
impairment tests and within the disclosures. One respondent answered that they would choose a 
CGU-specific WACC adapted to the different risk profile internally, but a company-wide 
WACC in the disclosures.  	  
The option of applying a specific WACC for the new CGU, for both internal impairment tests 
and within the disclosures, was by far the most common response in Question 7. As depicted in 
Table 5 on the next page, this was a common choice both by companies who previously used a 
company-wide WACC for all CGU’s, as well as by companies who previously used CGU-
specific WACC. 
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Table 5	  
Respondents that would apply a specific WACC both internally and externally for the new CGU. The respondents’ 
answer in Question 7 was cross-referenced with their answer in Questions 2 and 3.	  
Table 6 displays that five out of the six companies, which in Question 7 answered that they 
would use a company-wide WACC for the new CGU internally and externally, considered all of 
their existing CGU’s to have the same risk and used a company-wide WACC in all of them. The 
single company in the right column was the company that, in Table 4, explained that they used 
risk-adjusted cash flows instead of CGU-specific WACC. 	  
	  
Table 6	  
Respondents who would apply a company-wide WACC both internally and externally for the new CGU. The 
respondents’ answer in Question 7 is cross-referenced with their answer in Questions 2 and 3.	  
As seen in Figure 3, only one company chose an option in Question 7 that lead to an 
inconsistency between the WACC they used internally and the WACC they disclosed in the 
annual report. We cross-referenced this answer with the respondent’s answer in Questions 2 and 
3, and found that the company considered their already existing CGU’s to have the same risk, 
and applied a company-wide WACC in all of these.	  
5	  Case	  Studies	  -­‐	  Applying	  Best	  Practice	  for	  CGU-­‐specific	  WACC	  
The case studies are meant to provide understanding of best practice in accordance with IFRS 
and the previously presented literature from EY (2011), PwC (2012), KPMG (2012) and BDO 
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(2013). We intended to display praxis and analyse how a CGU-specific discount rate could be 
obtained and why the use of company-wide discount rate might be a simplistic approach. 	  
In the case studies we assumed that no asset specific discount rate were available on the market. 
The correct approach would therefore be to identify a peer group of companies to compare the 
WACC with (IAS 36:Appendix). The peer group companies should all be similar to the 
company in terms of size, industry, turnover, etc. We chose to use industry average WACC 
instead, as this allowed us to easier demonstrate differences in WACC components between a 
specific company and the market for specific CGU’s. A company that tries to identify a peer 
group for CGU-specific WACC from the database we used, should only include similar 
companies in the calculations, and make sure that these companies are only operating in the 
same industry as the CGU (EY, 2011). As described, we applied the traditional approach from 
IAS 36 in the case studies.	  
The modelling of a new discount rate is simplified, and we admit that without thorough 
information about internal operations and procedures, it would be difficult for us to make true 
estimations of what WACC the companies should apply in different CGU’s. However, as 
explained, the intention of the case studies was not to generate an exact discount rate that the 
companies should use, or to discuss how many rate points should be considered as a significant 
difference. As mentioned in section 2.5 of the thesis, the data used when we created the case 
studies was gathered from the database established by Stern School of Business (Damodaran, 
2014). First, we give a brief description of the chosen case companies. Then, we analyse the 
modelling of the case studies with the use of best practice and related literature. 	  
5.1	  The	  Case	  Companies	  
Company A	  
Company A (2013) is operating in the healthcare equipment industry and is listed on Large Cap. 
The company has three CGU’s, and stated that China, which is included in their Asia/Pacific 
CGU, is their second largest overall market. This would make China an appropriate comparison 
to use within the Asia/Pacific CGU. Company A was compared to a group of 22 Chinese 
companies operating in the health care equipment industry (Damodaran, 2014).	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Table 8 illustrates Company A’s division of CGU’s. This was used to determine that the specific 
CGU was substantial enough for calculating a specific CGU WACC. A similar review was made 
for all four case companies, but we have not provided CGU-specific tables for each company, as 
we did not consider disclosing this would add additional value to the analysis.	  
	  
Table 7	  
Company A’s CGU’s and allocated goodwill (Company A, 2013)	  
Company B	  
Company B (2013) is listed on Large Cap and operates in the machinery industry. The company 
has allocated goodwill to three different CGU’s, where two CGU’s consisted of geographical 
areas, and one CGU as the industry Construction. We chose to study the WACC for 
Construction, as it is separated from the other CGU’s, due to not being established by 
geographical factors. As Company B stated that a majority of sales for Construction can be 
referred to Europe, we chose construction companies in Europe as a suitable comparison. The 
group of European companies constituted 59 companies operating in the construction industry 
(Damodaran, 2014).	  
Company C	  
Company C (2013) is listed on Small Cap and operates within the printing and publishing sector. 
Company C has six CGU’s divided between different geographical areas. We regarded the CGU 
located in the U.S. as suitable, partially because it constituted a significant part of their total 
goodwill. Company C was compared to 97 American companies within the printing and 
publishing sector (Damodaran, 2014).	  
Company D	  
Company D (2013) is listed on Large Cap, and operates in the food processing industry. 
Company D has goodwill allocated to four CGU’s based on geographical areas. The case 
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analysis targeted the CGU consisted by the U.S., as this CGU accounted for a quite large amount 
of the overall allocated goodwill. The group of U.S. companies in the food processing industry 
that were used for comparison amounted to 97 (Damodaran, 2014).	  
5.2	  Case	  Study	  Analysis	  
The data we gathered from the Stern School of Business database can be seen in Table 8.  	  
	  
Table 8	  
Comparison of the components from a company-wide WACC and industry averages for the four case companies 
(Damodaran, 2014)	  
Below, we demonstrate the WACC calculation for Company A, and the 22 companies in the 
Chinese healthcare equipment industry. The WACC components from Table 8 are generated into 
Equation 1, but without the marginal tax rate effect:	  
 Company A:  WACC = (0,8845*0,0748) + (0,1155*0,0404) = 0,0708	  
 China:   WACC = (0,9753*0,0879) + (0,0247*0,0614) = 0,0872	  
Equation 1 gives an output before tax for Company A of 7,08% for their primary market. The 
average WACC for the Chinese healthcare equipment industry was 8,72%. The same 
calculations were undertaken for the other three companies and their different industry averages. 	  
The output of discount rates in Table 8 should be interpreted with caution. The level of WACC 
only demonstrates that there may exist a difference between industry average WACC where the 
specific CGU’s are located, and the company-wide WACC used by Companies A-D. The input 
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in Table 8 has not used unlevered betas, which means that the beta value is affected by the 
capital structure of the different companies. 	  
We now turn to analysing the different components displayed in Table 8. Let us recall the article 
from BDO (2013), which claimed that the use of a company-wide discount rate for CGU’s 
exposed to different markets, industries, jurisdictions, products, interest rates etc. is a common 
error in practice. An analysis of the components in Table 8 could help us understand why and 
where there may exist faults in the use of a company-wide discount rate for different CGU’s. In 
the following section we often refer to Company C. The reason for this is that it allows us to 
analyse one company more thoroughly. However, this analysis is also applicable on the other 
companies. Another interesting reason for choosing Company C was that the capital structure of 
Company C and the market capital structure displayed a substantial difference.  	  
Cost of Equity and the Risk Free Rate	  
From our results in Table 8 we see indications both of companies having lower and higher cost 
of equity than their respective comparisons. To understand the differences, we need to recall 
Equation 2 and the different components in the cost of equity. We take a closer look at Company 
C and its cost of equity compared to the industry average in the U.S.	  
The beta for Company C is a company-wide beta used in all of their CGU’s. This beta could be 
used as a benchmark, but should, according to (McPhee, 2012), be compared to other market 
participants. We start by finding unlevered betas in the material from Stern School of Business 
for both Company C and the U.S. publishing and newspapers industry average. These unlevered 
betas are 0,91 for company C and 0,87 for the industry average (Damodaran 2014). The beta 
should be levered by the market capital structure where the CGU is located (BDO, 2013). 
Company C’s current use of a higher beta than the industry unlevered average could have the 
impact that they would calculate a higher cost of equity than necessary, which could have an 
effect on the impairment test. Companies that apply a company-wide beta to all CGU’s could 
obtain a too high cost of equity in CGU’s located in industries/markets where the average beta is 
lower, and vice versa. 	  
The risk free rate and risk premium is also included in Equation 2. If we again use Company C 
for comparison we see that the long-term treasury bond rate for the U.S. and Sweden seems to be 
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almost the same. The material from Stern School of Business indicates that this rate is 
approximately 3,04%, and that the risk premium in Sweden and the U.S. are approximately 6% 
(Damodaran, 2014). This would therefore only have a limited effect on the cost of equity, but it 
is easy to realise that a company which has located CGU’s to, for instance emerging markets, 
which has a substantially higher risk premium, would obtain different values for their cost of 
equity and thereby WACC for those CGU’s. 	  
Cost of Debt	  
We turn again to Company C and notice in Table 8 that the cost of debt is lower for Company C 
than the U.S. industry average. KPMG (2012) implies that returns from peer group industrial 
bonds and ratings could be used to derive the cost of debt. If Company C used ratings from peer 
groups or its own debt instruments could be hard to determine, but its more likely that they used 
the cost of debt derived from their own debt instruments traded in the market if they have such 
instruments.	  
The tax rate displayed in Table 8 is the marginal tax rate for the country where the company is 
located, which is applicable according to KPMG (2012). The tax effect on WACC has been 
excluded in Table 8, since IAS 36 requires companies to use a pre-tax discount rate. If we again 
look at Company C, we see that the marginal tax rate differs between the U.S. and Sweden. This 
means that if a company would choose to disclose a post-tax discount rate, which is quite 
common according to BDO (2013), it leads to an inconsistency when they assume a company-
wide discount rate in all CGU’s. The marginal tax effect on the cost of debt, see Equation 1, 
could be quite substantial if the market debt level is high where the CGU is located. This would 
imply that companies make assumptions about marginal tax rates that are quite vague, when they 
disclose a post-tax company-wide discount rate, even if they have CGU’s located in markets that 
are heavily debt financed. 	  
Debt and Equity	  
As seen in Table 8, some of the companies have a quite different capital structure compared to 
the industry average they are operating in. Compared to the norm described by IAS 36:A19, EY 
(2011) and BDO (2013), this indicates a lack of comparability to the average market structure of 
companies operating in the same industry as the CGU. In their current state, it seems that the 
companies applied their overall company capital structure on all of their CGU’s. For instance, 
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Table 8 displays that Company C has a substantially different gearing ratio, i.e. debt/equity ratio, 
than the industry average in the U.S. The difference in gearing could probably partly be 
explained by the lower cost of debt for Company C than the U.S. industry average and vice versa 
regarding the cost of equity. If Company C had applied a market capital structure in the CGU in 
the U.S., the gearing would be different. The different gearing could then have an impact on the 
WACC for the CGU in the U.S., due to the difference in cost of equity etc. If Company C would 
try to calculate different WACC for their CGU’s, it is crucial that they calculate and estimate all 
of the included variables thoroughly. Otherwise, if Company C only use a market capital 
structure, but do not recalculate the cost of equity, they would overestimate the WACC for the 
CGU located in the U.S. 	  
The relation between a company’s capital structure and the market capital structure is perhaps 
the most interesting component in the case analysis. A company that would use its overall 
capital structure in all CGU’s, even if these are located in markets with a substantially higher 
risk, or a totally different industry, would make very random estimations of WACC (Bancel et 
al., 2013). For instance, if a company has one CGU in an emerging market and the rest of the 
CGU’s in mature markets with low risk, the cost of equity in the markets might differ 
substantially, but also the capital structure. If the emerging markets are more heavily equity 
financed, and suffers from a higher cost of equity, there could be a substantial difference in 
WACC between the different CGU’s. Therefore, it is necessary that companies make 
comparisons of components such as beta, capital structure and interest rates that are inherited in 
WACC with similar companies operating in the same industry/location as the CGU, as 
demonstrated by EY (2011) and McPhee (2012).  	  
6	  Analysis	  
6.1	  Analysis	  of	  Consistency	  Between	  Internal	  and	  Disclosed	  WACC	  
The empirical results in section 4.3.1 concluded that there was a large consistency among the 
survey respondents, between disclosed WACC and the WACC that were applied in internal 
impairment tests in CGU’s. As seen in Figure 3, the consistency between internal and external 
was also prevalent when we asked the companies to determine a WACC for a new hypothetical 
CGU, which had a different risk profile than already existing CGU’s. 	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If a company chose to disclose another discount rate in the annual report than the discount rate 
applied internally, it could be considered as opportunistic. Especially if the disclosed company-
wide discount rate was lower than the discount rate used internally in the impairment tests. This 
would also impact the sensitivity analysis that companies perform in accordance with IAS 36, as 
this analysis would be modelled by using a lower discount rate than what is applied internally. 
Contrary, if the disclosed discount rate would be higher than those used internally, it would have 
a negative impact on the company and the annual report, as it would lead users of the annual 
report to consider the CGU as more risky than what it actually is. This could also have an effect 
on what CGU’s stakeholders of the company considers optimal for the company to make 
internal investments in (Lambert et al., 2007).	  
The results from our survey promotes the view that companies are not acting in an opportunistic 
manner, but instead in accordance with the efficiency perspective of the positive accounting 
theory. This was supported by Figure 3, which demonstrates that a vast majority of the 
companies would apply a risk adapted CGU-specific WACC both internally and externally, 
when they established a new CGU with a different risk profile. Since Question 7 did not specify 
whether the risk for the new CGU, and thereby the discount rate, would be higher or lower than 
the company-wide discount rate, it is also an indication that companies would act according to 
the efficiency perspective, even if they would not benefit from it. One possible reason for 
companies to act in accordance with the efficiency perspective is that it might reduce their cost 
of capital (Lambert et al., 2007). 	  
The results presented in Table 5, is another factor that indicated an efficiency perspective from 
the companies. Both companies that applied a company-wide discount rate, due to having same 
risk in CGU’s, and companies that applied CGU risk-adjusted discount rates, due to having 
different risk in CGU’s, would use a specific risk-adjusted WACC for a new CGU internally and 
externally. Though, one implication needs to be considered. First, the respondents of the survey 
could be considered as financial experts by the definition from Custodio and Metzger (2012). 
Therefore, as also proposed by the normative isomorphism, the survey answers may be 
influenced by what is considered as common professional conduct, and could therefore be biased 
towards an option aligned with best practice. 	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Therefore, we analysed if a common professional conduct might have influenced the companies 
that stated they would choose a CGU-specific WACC both internally and externally for a new 
CGU. We reviewed the 14 companies that in Table 5 considered their previous CGU’s to have 
the same risk and only used a company-wide WACC. These 14 companies were reduced by two 
companies, which claimed that they only had one CGU. One especially interesting observation 
was that one of the 12 companies that remained, had stated that their reason for previously using 
a company-wide WACC, was that they did not have any relevant method to produce WACC for 
different CGU’s. If this company did not have any relevant method to produce different specific 
WACC, this could be an indication that their answer in Question 7 was influenced by what they 
believed to be the correct answer, instead of how they actually would act.  	  
We then analysed the existing CGU’s of the remaining 11 companies. We admit that the internal 
estimation of risk in specific CGU’s is often based on information that is not disclosed and could 
be hard to evaluate as an outsider. It was therefore difficult for us to make a thorough analysis of 
the specific risk in the CGU’s for these companies. However, the most prevalent cases of doubt, 
regarding similarities in risks for CGU’s, is when CGU’s are divided between substantially 
different markets, products and/or geographical areas (BDO, 2013). This type of distribution of 
CGU’s were evident for some of the 11 companies, which was an indication that the CGU’s 
faced different circumstances and were exposed to different risks (PwC, 2012). Furthermore, 
some of the 11 companies also concluded in their annual reports that the markets, where the 
CGU’s were located, would develop differently in the future. This was another indication that 
the CGU’s might be exposed to different risk. To conclude, it would be hard to determine an 
exact number of companies that would not, based on their existing CGU’s, actually choose a 
CGU-specific WACC for a new CGU, even though they stated it in Question 7. However, we 
consider it to be likely that some of the answers from these 11 companies were influenced by a 
common professional practice.	  
Question 7 also has a clear connection to the perspective of decoupling. The decoupling 
perspective is related to whether companies choose to disclose a CGU-specific WACC, even 
though they would use a company-wide WACC for all CGU’s internally. Although we did not 
find any indication of this conduct in Question 7, we found some evidence of this in Questions 2 
and 3. As seen in Table 3, two companies answered that they regarded all their CGU’s to have 
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the same risk, but nonetheless chose to apply various specific WACC for different CGU’s 
internally and in the disclosures. Furthermore, in Table 3, another company also regarded all 
their CGU’s to have the same risk, but applied CGU-specific WACC for some CGU’s and a 
company-wide WACC for some. The application and disclosure of CGU-specific WACC, 
although CGU’s have the same risk, could indicate that a company would like to be perceived as 
operating in a certain manner, and to have followed certain institutional practices. The reason for 
the three companies to apply and disclose CGU-specific WACC, when this procedure was 
perhaps not necessary, could be that they wanted to be regarded as knowledgeable about risk and 
specific WACC assessments. Related to this is the mimetic isomorphism of the institutional 
theory, since companies might try to mimic disclosure conduct of competitors perceived to be 
operating after a best practice, in order to gain legitimacy. 	  
In Question 7 one company answered that they would use a specific WACC for the new CGU 
internally, but the company-wide WACC within the disclosures. This company also stated in the 
survey that they regarded their existing CGU’s to have the same risk, and that a company-wide 
WACC was used in all of these. As the company previously only had disclosed a single WACC, 
they might have considered this as an opportunity to continue to disclose a company-wide 
WACC, even though they would use a specific WACC for the new CGU internally. This could 
be connected to Ax and Marton’s (2008) points on disclosure strategies, as this conduct perhaps 
would be used to avoid disclosing specific risk assessments about the new CGU for competitors. 
Companies may be reluctant of disclosing CGU-specific WACC, due to competitors operating in 
the same markets and due to revealing future possibilities or concerns. 	  
Earlier in the analysis we argued that it would be considered an opportunistic act if companies 
disclosed a company-wide WACC that was lower than an actual CGU-specific WACC applied 
internally. We have now also introduced a possible opportunistic behaviour, which was evident 
among some respondents. Namely, that some companies are inconsistent between their internal 
and disclosed WACC, in order to gain competitive advantages or increase legitimacy.	  
6.2	  Incentives	  for	  Applying	  a	  Company-­‐wide	  WACC	  
An analysis of the incentives for why companies might choose to apply a single company-wide 
WACC for all CGU’s, adds on to the prior section of the analysis. Therefore, we focused 
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primarily on the companies that, in Table 3, stated that they applied a company-wide WACC for 
all CGU’s internally. Table 4 was also analysed extensively, as it displayed how companies 
argued about their choice of a company-wide WACC.	  
We first identified different scenarios in which it could be correct to apply a company-wide 
WACC on all CGU’s internally. We decided upon two different scenarios, which both are 
represented in Table 4. The first scenario is related to the company that considered their CGU’s 
to have different risk, but explained that those risks were already calculated for in the CGU’s 
cash flows. This conduct is aligned with the expected cash flow approach explained in the 
Appendix of IAS 36, and should therefore be considered as aligned with the efficiency 
perspective. Other than adjusting the WACC for different CGU’s, i.e. the traditional approach, 
adjusting the cash flows is the only valid option, if the CGU’s are affected by different risk 
(McPhee, 2012). Since it was only one company that claimed they applied the expected cash 
flow approach instead of the traditional approach, it was especially interesting to analyse the 
other arguments displayed in Table 4.     	  
We considered it unlikely that companies that claimed to have the same risk for all CGU’s had 
risk-adjusted their cash flows, as this would indicate that the CGU’s did in fact not have the 
same risk. This leads us to the second scenario that is correct, which is that all CGU’s actually 
have the same risk, and therefore should use the same level of WACC. As mentioned earlier, 
some of the arguments that companies considered their CGU’s similar with respect to risk, could 
be questioned. Though, we again have to emphasise that it could be hard for us to determine if 
the risk between CGU’s actually differ for companies that claimed that their CGU’s had the 
same risk. However, we could argue that for companies to decide upon a company-wide WACC 
in all their CGU’s, they should have identified an asset specific WACC on the market, or if this 
was not applicable, identified a peer group of companies to compare the CGU WACC with. We 
questioned the likelihood that companies did an analysis of best practice, and nonetheless 
decided to apply the exact same company-wide WACC for all CGU’s.  	  
The application of a company-wide WACC also inherits some more questionable scenarios than 
the ones we previously presented. If a company conducted best practice in order to establish 
CGU-specific WACC, and found some variance from the company-wide WACC, but still chose 
to apply a company-wide WACC, it would be an opportunistic act. The opportunistic conduct 
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could be exemplified by the four case studies, displayed in Table 8. For all four case companies, 
the modelling of WACC displayed a lower company WACC than what the CGU-specific 
WACC might have been. We could argue that if a company followed best practice from the 
Appendix in IAS 36 and identified an asset specific WACC, or a peer group of companies, and 
then came to the same result as we did for the industry averages, an application of the company-
wide WACC would be an opportunistic act, e.g. in order to apply a lower WACC and avoid an 
impairment of goodwill in certain CGU’s. This could be somewhat supported by what Kruger et 
al. (2011) claimed, i.e. companies that benefit from a low company-wide WACC might consider 
it as an arbitrage opportunity for risky investments. 	  
A possible opportunistic behaviour is also represented in Table 6, from the five companies that 
would use a company-wide WACC internally and externally for a new CGU, even though they 
have not claimed to apply the expected cash flow approach. This would be an incorrect conduct, 
since we clearly stated in the survey question that the new CGU would have a different risk-
profile than existing CGU’s. All of these companies stated in Question 2 that they considered 
their prior CGU’s to have the same risk. This means that their choice in Question 7 could be to 
simplify their impairment procedures and the application of WACC, as well as to gain the 
advantage of not having to disclose a CGU-specific WACC.	  
To understand the choices made by these five companies in Question 7, we looked at Table 4, 
which displayed their arguments for choosing a company-wide WACC. One of the companies 
claimed that they applied a company-wide WACC for practical reasons. We also look at the 
respondent that considered it hard to determine differences in risk between CGU´s, and the 
company that claimed to have no relevant method to produce specific WACC for CGU’s. 
However, this last company stated that they would choose a CGU-specific WACC for the new 
CGU. Though, as discussed earlier in the analysis, we considered that this company’s choice in 
Question 7 might have been influenced by common professional conduct. We found it somewhat 
remarkable that companies, which had difficulties to produce CGU-specific WACC with the 
traditional approach, did not apply the expected cash flow approach, since the expected cash 
flow approach could be applied if a company has problems with identifying an asset specific 
discount rate or a peer group. If a company chose to apply a company-wide WACC on CGU’s 
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with different risk, when cash flows could be adjusted, it might indicate an opportunistic act to 
gain advantages. 	  
The reasons for companies to apply a company-wide WACC, even though differences in risk are 
evident, could be analysed by the ambiguity that seems to exist in calculation of WACC. EY 
(2011) claimed that the calculation of WACC is complex and that there seems to be no general 
consensus about how these calculations are made. Jacob and Shivdasani (2012) reviewed each of 
the components in the WACC equation, and determined that users chose to derive the various 
components from different sources and thereby obtained different outcomes. If the components 
are hard to calculate and if there is no real consensus, it might indicate a complex framework. 
We see an indication of this in Table 4, as one company argued for a company-wide WACC due 
to financing their new investments in the same way. This procedure is not aligned with IAS 
36:A19, which specifies that the discount rate is independent from how the company financed 
the purchase of the asset. The reason for this is that the future cash flows from the asset is not 
affected by how the company financed the purchase of it. Another indication of a complex 
framework is derived from the company that claimed to have no relevant method of producing 
CGU-specific WACC. 	  
The identification of a peer group, if an asset specific WACC is not available on the market, is 
another issue that adds even more complexity into the establishment of CGU-specific WACC. 
We obtained industry averages provided by Stern School of Business for our case studies when 
we analysed the components to include in a CGU-specific WACC. If companies would use 
figures from similar databases in actual internal impairment tests, they should bear in mind that 
they put a large amount of trust in the information provided in the database, and how the 
information was gathered. 	  
The liberal regulation for establishing CGU’s could further complicate the idea of finding a peer 
group with similar prerequisites as a specific CGU. For example, if a company has very unusual 
products, which are not manufactured by many other companies, it could be quite hard to 
identify a peer group. Another complication is if a company has a CGU located in a foreign 
country, e.g. where companies may not comply with IFRS, which could make it even more 
difficult to find relevant figures. Somewhat related to this is the discussion by Ax and Marton’s 
(2008), regarding how companies might avoid disclosing information from a lack of knowledge 
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on how to measure it. Hence, if companies find the procedures of producing CGU-specific 
WACC incomprehensible, or impractical, they might stick with a more general assessment and 
apply a company-wide WACC. 	  
The discussion on how to establish CGU-specific WACC could be further analysed by the 
concept of cost and benefit, from the Conceptual Framework of IFRS. If we recall the arguments 
made by respondents in Table 4, we argue that some these arguments are likely influenced by 
the time and cost it could take to establish a CGU-specific WACC. Again, we could relate this to 
disclosure strategies, and how companies might be reluctant to disclose information associated 
with a high gathering cost (Ax and Marton, 2008). The process of establishing CGU-specific 
WACC could be time consuming, and the components inherited in it might not always be truly 
reliable. Therefore, companies might feel reluctant to follow best practice, and produce CGU-
specific WACC, as they may consider a company-wide WACC to be more aligned with a cost-
benefit approach.	  
The analysis of the complexity of establishing CGU-specific WACC could also be discussed 
with the use of Figure 2. As presented in Figure 2, there were five companies that had ten or 
more CGU’s with CGU-specific WACC. It could be argued that if some of the companies with 
the largest amount of CGU’s were able to establish CGU-specific WACC, companies with a 
more limited number of CGU’s with different risk should therefore also be able to do this in a 
cost beneficial manner.  
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7	  Discussion	  of	  Results	  
In this paper we questioned how a company-wide WACC is aligned with the fact that it is 
common for companies to allocate CGU’s to different markets/geographical areas/products, as 
those CGU’s could be exposed to different risks. We considered this as an important issue to 
analyse, since the application of a company-wide WACC might imply that companies act 
opportunistic when performing impairment tests in CGU’s. In order to recognise incentives to 
apply a company-wide WACC, it was also important to analyse if there was consistency 
between internally applied WACC and disclosed WACC. 	  
We found that a majority of the Swedish listed companies studied in this paper, did in fact apply 
a company-wide WACC within different CGU’s. Our survey answers then indicated that some 
companies decoupled their internal WACC from the WACC disclosed in the annual report. 
However, decoupling does not seem to be the reason for the large amount of companies that 
disclosed a company-wide WACC within their annual reports. Instead, our survey concluded 
that there was a large consistency among companies between the WACC applied internally and 
the WACC disclosed in the annual report. 	  
The subjective nature of calculating WACC and performing impairment tests in CGU’s could 
enable ways for companies to act opportunistically. We found limited evidence that supported an 
opportunistic behaviour among the included companies, but companies seemed to a larger extent 
apply an efficiency perspective. However, we identified a risk of an opportunistic action when 
applying a company-wide WACC, which was likely enlarged when a company had a CGU in a 
market with a substantially higher risk than other CGU’s. Companies residing in Sweden, which 
might benefit from a low cost of capital, could consider it an arbitrage opportunity to apply their 
company-wide WACC in CGU’s with a higher risk, possibly in order to avoid an impairment. 
We did not find substantial evidence for this specific opportunistic action from the results of our 
survey, as the majority of the companies in fact would choose to apply an appropriate risk-
adjusted WACC for a new CGU.	  
The practical reasons for applying a company-wide WACC seems to be aligned with difficulties 
of producing CGU-specific WACC. There is likelihood that companies do not consider the 
benefits of a CGU-specific WACC to outweigh the costs of producing it. For Swedish 
companies, which might have a low cost of capital, the benefits for a company to follow best 
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practice and produce CGU-specific WACC could be viewed as somewhat ambiguous. We only 
recognised one benefit, which is related to a decreased cost of capital, due to being perceived as 
legitimate through extensive disclosures. 	  
The inconsistent use, both regarding the application of a company-wide WACC and how the 
components of WACC are derived could harm the comparability between annual reports. In 
order to increase the comparability, there might be a need to increase the incentives of applying 
CGU-specific WACC, or to regulate the area differently. The subjective manner of how 
companies are allowed to establish CGU’s is one factor that seems to influence the 
inconsistencies in the application of WACC. This subjectivity further influences the practice of 
finding a suitable peer group of companies for a CGU, in order to create a specific WACC. The 
lack of application of the expected cash flow approach, as well as other inconsistencies with the 
norm established in the Appendix of IAS 36, is an indication that IASB should work to increase 
the knowledge of both the expected cash flow approach and how to produce CGU-specific 
WACC. From the survey answers, as well as in the case studies, we recognised that impairment 
of goodwill is a method that contains a lot of subjective estimates and valuations. Consequently, 
IASB should consider the question whether impairment is a method to prefer, or if it would be 
better to amortise goodwill.	  
Overall, our findings suggest that companies do not seem reluctant towards the idea of applying 
CGU-specific WACC for different CGU’s. However, some companies appear to have 
difficulties of finding efficient ways of establishing a CGU-specific WACC. 	  
7.1	  Future	  Research	  
• In order to get at better understanding of the practices and difficulties of establishing 
CGU-specific WACC, more thorough case analyses could be conducted. One or several 
companies could be approached to discuss internal procedures of CGU risk assessments. 
If the approached companies previously only applied a company-wide WACC, the 
information could be used to find a suitable peer group with a number of identical 
companies, to produce a CGU-specific WACC. By conducting these case studies, a 
deeper discussion could also be made on the reasonability of these procedures, especially 
with regards to cost and benefit.  	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• Companies that benefits from a low cost of capital might have incentives to apply their 
company-wide WACC in CGU’s that are located in markets with a substantially higher 
risk. Therefore it would be interesting to use regression analysis in order to see if there is 
a statistically significant relationship between the use of company-wide WACC and 
CGU’s located in markets with higher risk than the overall company.  
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Appendix	  
Appendix	  A	  –	  Data	  from	  Annual	  Reports	  
The entirety of our gathered data from the 118 annual reports. The spreadsheet depicts company name, type of discount rate, level of discount 
rate, NASDAQ OMX Stockholm segment, number of CGU’s, and the names of their CGU’s. 
Companies 1-39
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Appendix A, continued 
Companies 40-79
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Appendix A, continued 
Companies 80-118 
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Appendix	  B	  –	  Survey	  
The English version of the survey. An asterisk indicates that the question was 
mandatory. 
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Appendix	  C	  –	  Survey	  Answers	  
The answers received from each of the companies. The questions can be viewed in Appendix B. 
 
